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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Dismayed at the slow progress being made in reducing the nation’s 
reliance on fossil fuels, many scholars have decried the divergence 
between energy and environmental law.1  An especially illustrative example 
of this divide is found in the differing geographic scope of programs 
designed to cap greenhouse gases, on the one hand, and programs 
designed to grow the market for renewable energy, on the other. 
With respect to greenhouse gas reductions, many states are adopting a 
regional approach.  Examples include the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative,2 the Midwest Accord,3 and the Western Climate Initiative,4 each 
of which embody a regional approach to greenhouse gas reductions.  In 
contrast, renewable portfolio standards (“RPSs”), currently the most 
powerful engine for the growth of renewable power,5 remain primarily 
 1. Lincoln Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment Disconnect, 
46 IDAHO L. REV. 473, 475-99 (2010); Amy J. Wildermuth, Is Environmental Law a 
Barrier to Emerging Alternative Energy Sources, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 509 (2010). 
 2. See REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/ (last visited July 
13, 2011).  There are ten founding members of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(“RGGI”):  Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont.  However, Governor Chris Christie 
of New Jersey recently announced that his State would withdraw from RGGI by the end 
of the 2011.  See Christopher Baxter, Gov. Christie Announces N.J. Pulling Out of 
Regional Environmental Initiative, NJ.COM (May 28, 2011), http://www.nj.com/politics/ 
index.ssf/2011/05/gov_christie_to_announce_nj_pu.html.  Meanwhile, the State of New 
York is being sued by an oil-industry funding organization in an effort to end New 
York’s participation in RGGI as well.  See Mireya Navarro, Group Sues to End N.Y.’s 
Role in Regional Cap-and-Trade, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2011), http://green.blogs.ny 
times.com/2011/06/29/group-sues-to-end-n-y-s-role-in-regional-cap-and-trade/. 
 3.  See Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Accord 2007, OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR SCOTT 
WALKER (2007), available at http://www.wisgov.state.wi.us/docview.asp?docid=12497.  
Signatories of the Accord are Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Kansas 
and the Canadian Province of Manitoba.  Observers of the Accord are Indiana, Ohio, and 
South Dakota, as well as the Canadian Province of Ontario.  Implementation of the 
Accord was put on hold in 2009, pending what was considered to be imminent action by 
the U.S. Congress to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.  Although Congress did not act, 
at least one climate watchdog group reports that the Accord is not being implemented.  
See Emily Kelchen, Midwest Climate Accord Abandoned, GREAT LAKES LEGAL FOUND. 
REGULATORY WATCH (Jan. 4, 2011), http://gllf-regwatch.org/index.php?q=blog/2011/01 
/04/midwest-climate-accord-abandon ed. 
 4. See W. CLIMATE INITIATIVE, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/ (last visited 
July 12, 2011). 
 5. For instance, from 1999 through 2010, 63% of the wind power capacity built 
in the United States was located in states with renewable portfolio standard (“RPS”) 
policies.  Existing RPS programs are projected to increase annual average renewable 
energy additions by 4–6 gigawatts (“GW”) per year between 2011 and 2020.  In the 
aggregate, existing state RPS policies are estimated to require roughly 100 GW of new 
renewable capacity by 2035, which represents 7% of total U.S. retail electricity sales in 
that year and 32% of projected load growth between 2000 and 2035.  See Ryan Wiser & 
Mark Bolinger, 2010 Wind Technologies Market Report, DEP’T OF ENERGY 62–63 (June 
2011), available at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/wind/pdfs/51783.pdf. 
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the product of states working largely independently of each other.  State 
RPSs expand the market for renewable power by requiring utilities to 
obtain a certain share of their energy from renewable sources.  As of this 
writing, 26 states, plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, have 
adopted a mandatory RPS requiring energy suppliers to demonstrate a 
minimum percentage of renewable energy in their energy portfolio.  
Four other states have alternative energy portfolio standards that allow 
suppliers to comply with a broader set of energy resources. Eight other 
states have adopted a voluntary, as opposed to a mandatory, standard.6  
Although many states employ regional organizations for the registration of 
renewable energy credits (“RECs”), unlike greenhouse gas emissions 
limits, states have yet to join together to adopt uniform RPS requirements 
within a specific region.  Instead, although not always unique, each state 
that has enacted an RPS has its own renewable energy target, its own 
standards for what type of energy generation satisfies the renewable 
energy mandate, and, perhaps most importantly, its own rules for favoring 
renewable energy generated within the territorial borders of the state. 
This last aspect of state RPSs has the most parochial effect of any of 
the differences among state standards.  Just about every state imposes 
either a geographic location restriction or a location incentive in an attempt 
to steer utilities toward the purchase of renewable power generated within 
the state.7  Such location restrictions are often implemented through the 
state’s rules and regulations governing RECs—environmental commodities 
used by suppliers to comply with the RPS mandate of a given state.8  
 6. See CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, http://www.pewclimate.org 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2011). 
 7. For example, the Western Renewable Energy Generation Information System 
(“WREGIS”) is an independent renewable energy tracking system that tracks the 
generation and trade of the renewable energy generated within those western states that 
are members of WREGIS.  See W. RENEWABLE ENERGY GENERATION INFO. SYS., 
http://www.wregis.org/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).   For a discussion of the importance 
of a regional tracking system to the integrity of the renewable energy credit (“REC”) 
compliance mechanism to state RPS laws, see Matthew McDonnell, Kirsten H. Engel & 
Ardeth Barnhart, The Potential and Power of Renewable Energy Credits to Enhance Air 
Quality and Economic Development in Arizona, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2012). 
 8.   According to the excellent definition provided by researchers at the Lawrence 
Berkeley National Laboratory, “a REC is created when a megawatt-hour of renewable 
energy is generated, is a purely financial product, and can be traded separately from the 
underlying electricity generation.  REC transactions create a supplemental revenue stream for 
renewable generators, and allow retail suppliers to demonstrate compliance with an RPS 
by purchasing RECs in lieu of directly purchasing renewable electricity.”  See Ryan 
Wiser & Galen Barbose, Renewable Portfolio Standards in the United States: A Status 
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RECs may accompany the electricity produced by the renewable resource 
(in which case the REC is said to be “bundled” with the renewable 
energy), or generators may sell the RECs separate from the electricity (in 
which case the REC and the renewable energy are referred to as 
“unbundled”).9  In states whose RPS incorporates geographic restrictions 
or in-state incentive provisions, the law usually requires either that the 
RECs used to satisfy the state RPS is “bundled,” or that the RECs represent 
renewable energy generated within the state or sold to consumers within 
the state.10 
Not surprisingly, restrictions upon where eligible renewable power 
can be generated undermine the potential efficiency of the expanded 
renewable energy markets created by state RPS laws.  Take, for instance, 
the situation where, due to less windy conditions, wind energy generated 
within one state is twice as expensive as wind energy generated in a 
nearby state.  By restricting the wind energy that satisfies the state’s RPS to 
wind energy generated within the state’s borders, the state’s ratepayers pay 
more than they would for wind energy generated in the nearby state.  
Eliminating such geographic restrictions—by allowing, in the provided 
example, utilities to satisfy the state RPS with wind energy generated in a 
neighboring state—increases the efficiency of the renewable energy 
market, resulting in the generation of more renewable energy for the same 
(subsidized) price. 
More than efficiency is at stake.  The legality of those state RPS laws 
that incorporate a geographic restriction may be in the mix as well.  The 
dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from discriminating against, 
or imposing an undue burden upon, interstate commerce for the benefit 
of its residents.11  Under this doctrine, the Supreme Court has already 
invalidated state regulation of electricity that discriminates in favor of 
state ratepayers.12  Hence, geographic location restrictions upon the source 
of the renewable power used to satisfy a state’s RPS risks constitutional 
challenge. 
Report with Data Through 2007, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB. 2 n.3 (Apr. 2008), 
available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/lbnl-154e.pdf. 
 9. See Bruce Elder, Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) in California, UNIV. OF 
SAN DIEGO 7 (June 2007), available at http://www.sandiego.edu/epic/research_reports/ 
documents/070625_RECs_SB107_FINAL_000.pdf (discussing the nature of “bundled” 
and “unbundled” RECs). 
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 21–43. 
 11. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623–24 (1978). 
 12. New England v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339 (1982) (“The order of the 
New Hampshire Commission, prohibiting New England Power from selling its hydroelectric 
energy outside the State of New Hampshire, is precisely the sort of protectionist regulation 
that the Commerce Clause declares off-limits to the states.”). 
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Some have suggested a national RPS as an antidote to the inefficiency 
of state-level RPS programs.13  A national RPS would address these 
inefficiencies by broadening the renewable power market, enabling trades 
from coast to coast.  Better yet, a national RPS would offer policy 
consistency across states and impose a renewable energy mandate in the 
twenty states that currently lack an RPS.  Nevertheless, efforts to pass a 
national RPS have failed repeatedly in Congress.14  Experts disagree 
over whether a national RPS is currently politically feasible.15 
One major stumbling block to a national RPS is that not all states 
would benefit similarly under a national program.  Thus the idea of 
a national RPS suffers from the very same reason that states continue to 
impose geographic restrictions upon the location of renewable power 
satisfying the state mandate: states seek a return on their investment in 
renewable power.  After all, a RPS is a ratepayer-based subsidy for 
renewable power.  Geographic restrictions upon qualifying renewable 
energy are understandable attempts by states to receive a quid pro quo—
benefits in the form of jobs, taxes and a renewable energy business sector.  
Why should a state pour ratepayer dollars into supporting renewable 
power generated in a nearby state, rather than in its own?  
While leading to inefficiencies, state restrictions upon the generation 
location of renewable energy exist to ensure that the state reaps 
economic development benefits associated with the state’s subsidy of 
renewable power through the state RPS.  Without this incentive, it is 
possible that state support for a RPS would diminish.  True, all states 
enjoy the climate change mitigation that accompany the displacement of 
fossil fuel generated electricity with renewable resource generated 
electricity, regardless of whether any renewable power generators are 
actually located within their borders.  However, given that there is little 
to prevent a state from free-riding off of the provision of this benefit by 
 13. See Lincoln Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 
CONN. L. REV. 1339 (2010). 
 14.  In 2009, the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee passed a bill 
that included a national renewable energy standard (“RES”) of 15% by 2021.  However, 
this bill failed to gain approval from the full Senate.  Also in 2009, the House passed the 
Waxman-Markey climate bill, which contained a more aggressive national RPS–20% by 
2020.  Nevertheless, the House and Senate failed to agree on a climate bill and hence the 
national RPS was never signed into law. 
 15.  But see Brian Walsh, Can Congress Pass a Renewable Portfolio Standard?, 
TIME (July 26, 2010), http://ecocentric.blogs.time.com/2010/07/26/can-congress-pass-a-
renewable-energy-standard/ (reporting that the same Republican congressional leaders 
that oppose a national carbon cap can support enactment of a national RES). 
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other states, this climate change mitigation benefit is likely undervalued 
by state policymakers.  In suggesting that states organize themselves into 
regional trading regimes, this article seeks a response to the economic 
inefficiencies and legal threats attending the current state-level approach 
in which states do not want to give up—or at least not give up entirely—
the economic development benefits associated with state support of 
renewable power.  The logic for regional trading regimes is simple.  
First, a regional renewable energy market is more efficient than a state-
level market and hence ratepayers should pay less where utilities are 
allowed to comply with state RPS mandates with renewable power 
generated or delivered into the region, as opposed to being limited to 
complying with power generated within or delivered within the state.  
Second, all of the states within a given area stand to gain economically 
from a strong regional market in renewable energy.  There is at least the 
potential that, in the aggregate, the economic development benefits 
from a strong regional renewable power market exceeds the sum of the 
region’s individual state renewable power markets.  Finally, given that 
many of the benefits of renewable power generation are regional, 
regional-level restrictions upon the generation of renewable energy 
likely have a better chance of withstanding Commerce Clause scrutiny 
than state-level restrictions. 
There still remains the tricky question of how to implement a regional 
approach to renewable energy markets.  To form a regional market, 
states must allow energy suppliers to comply with the state RPS through 
the use of RECs generated in other states within the same region.  States 
may be unwilling to do so unilaterally.  Hence adoption of a regional 
approach will require collective agreement on the part of all of the states 
in a given region that they will each repeal restrictions or incentives for 
energy suppliers to purchase renewable energy generated in-state, and 
replace such restrictions and incentives with those that at most favor the 
purchase of renewable power generated within the same region. 
This brings us back full circle to the states’ regional agreements to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  Such agreements can serve as models 
for regional agreements with respect to state subsidization for renewable 
energy.  Thus far, the most successful regional agreement for greenhouse 
gas emissions cuts is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”).  
Under RGGI, ten northeastern states jointly agreed to regulate greenhouse 
gas emissions from their own electricity sectors.16  The agreement 
among all of the states in the region to independently impose greenhouse 
 16. Memorandum of Understanding, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, REG’L 
GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (Dec. 20, 2005), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/ 
mou_final_12_20_05.pdf. 
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gas emission standards prevents the import of electricity from any other 
state within the region from undercutting the environmental benefits of 
the regional scheme.17 
There is much to be said in favor of a regional approach with respect 
to renewable energy mandates.  First, uniformity in the particulars of 
state RPS laws would assist the growing interstate renewable energy 
market.  Second, allowing renewable power that is generated anywhere 
but delivered locally to satisfy the RPS of any of the states within the 
region, should enhance the reliability of the market for renewable power, 
increase the amount of intermittent power accommodated by the grid, 
and lower the price of renewable power.   Each of these effects will 
strengthen the regional market for renewable power to the overall benefit 
of each state within the region.  Finally, while facial prohibitions upon 
the eligibility of power generated outside the region to satisfy a state 
RPS are likely to be considered just as repugnant to the dormant Commerce 
Clause as prohibitions upon electricity generated out-of-state, the same 
is likely not true with respect to non-facially discriminatory provisions 
designed to protect a regional, as opposed to a state, market.  This is 
primarily because many of the benefits of such a provision—especially 
the air quality benefits—would be sustained by the entire region, as opposed 
to any particular state. 
II.  STATE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS: THE PREVALENCE                
OF THE “GO IT ALONE” APPROACH 
While there are considerable similarities between state RPS laws and 
policies, what is remarkable, especially in view of the trend toward 
regional regulation in greenhouse gas emissions limitations, is the extent 
to which RPS policies are a product of state-level concerns and priorities. 
 17. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 16; see also Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative Model Rule, REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (Dec. 31, 2008), available 
at http://www.rggi.org/docs/Model%20Rule%20Revised%2012.31.08.pdf. 
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A.  Similar Design Features Mask a Wealth of                           
Difference in Detail 
Commentators have remarked upon the similarity in the design 
features incorporated into just about every state RPS.18  True enough, all 
RPSs require suppliers located within the state (and often other entities 
as well) to procure a minimum percentage or amount of electricity 
generation or capacity from renewable resources by a particular date, 
with such percentage usually increasing over time until it hits a 
designated threshold at some future date.19  Similarly, each RPS usually 
specifies the type of renewable resources that satisfies the minimum 
percentage or amount of renewable energy required, and also the entities 
subject to the mandate.20  Finally, each RPS specifies how compliance 
will be determined; whether through a demonstration of the purchase of 
a minimum number of RECs or through power purchase agreements with 
renewable energy generators.21 
But the superficial similarity in the design elements of state RPS laws 
masks great diversity in whether the renewable standard is mandatory or 
voluntary, the types of resources that qualify as renewable, the scope of 
the requirements, and the means by which compliance with program 
requirements are achieved and monitored.22  For instance, virtually all 
state RPSs are satisfied by core renewable resources such as wind, biomass, 
methane, photovoltaic solar generators and thermal solar generation.  
However, a slightly smaller number of states also give credit for geothermal 
generation and landfill gas.23  Additionally, several states allowed electricity 
 18. See, e.g., Barry G. Rabe, Race to the Top: The Expanding Role of U.S. State 
Renewable Portfolio Standards, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS 5 (June 
2006), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/RPSReportFinal.pdf. 
 19. See generally DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, 
http://www.dsireusa.org (last visited Sept. 16, 2011) (presenting a comprehensive list of 
the renewables percentage target applicable under each state’s RPS). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.  For example, under Arizona’s RES, “utilities subject to the RES must 
obtain renewable energy credits . . . from eligible renewable resources to meet 15% of 
their retail electric load by 2025 and thereafter.”  Arizona: Incentive/Policies for Renewable 
Energy, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www. 
dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=AZ03R&re=1&ee=0 (last updated 
June 29, 2011). 
 22. For excellent (and comprehensive) overviews of the variation in state RPS 
programs, see Davies, supra note 13, at 1386–90; Wiser & Barbose, supra note 8, at 6–
10.  See also Wiser & Barbose, supra note 8, at 6 (“[D]esign variations among states are 
so stark that there is even some debate over what exactly constitutes an RPS, and 
whether certain states qualify as having one.”). 
 23. See Davies, supra note 13, at 1376. 
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and/or heat from combined heat and power and/or waste heat recovery 
facilities to “count” toward satisfaction of the RPS.24 
Other examples of differences between state RPS laws abound.  In an 
effort to encourage the development of certain renewable resources, 
many states offer a “credit multiplier” for these purchases.  However, 
states differ drastically in determining which resources receive such a 
credit multiplier and the size of the multiplier.  For example, Colorado 
provides a 300 percent credit for solar energy, Delaware offers a 350 
percent credit for offshore wind energy, and Utah affords a 240 percent 
multiplier for in-state solar facilities.25 
Another important difference is the manner in which states use 
RECs to ensure compliance.  For instance, states differ in the length of 
time a REC remains viable—also referred to as the REC’s “shelf 
life”—for purposes of satisfying the state RPS.  Some states, such as 
Arizona, place no cap on the length of time a REC is considered viable.  
Other states impose caps of varying lengths, such as five years in 
Colorado26 and four years in Wisconsin.27  A cap upon a REC’s shelf life 
encourages the ongoing development of renewable resources, as RECs 
cannot be held indefinitely and used to comply with a state’s mandate. 
B.  State RPS Geographic Location Restrictions 
Perhaps the best demonstration of the state-centered nature of state 
RPS policies is the degree to which such policies favor the in-state 
generation of renewable energy.  Most states use the possession of RECs 
as the mechanism whereby retail suppliers demonstrate compliance with 
the RPS.  Hence, in most states, geographic restrictions are expressed as 
conditions upon the creation of RECs for RPS compliance purposes.  
With few exceptions, states organize their requirements to favor the in-
state generation of renewable power. 
 24. See also Wiser & Barbose, supra note 8, at 8 tbl.1 (Colorado, Connecticut, 
Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Nevada and North Carolina). 
 25. Davies, supra note 13, at 1377; see also Wiser & Barbose, supra note 8, at 8 
tbl.1. 
 26. Davies, supra note 13, at 1378. 
 27. Thomas Content, Advocates Say Wind Projects in Jeopardy, JS ONLINE (May 
25, 2011), http://www.jsonline.com/business/122630524.html (discussing a state bill that 
would prevent the expiration of renewable energy credits even after four years and its 
predicted impact of weakening the state market for renewable energy). 
 87 
 
ENGEL FINAL AUTHOR EDITS ACCEPTED WITH UPDATE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/2016  2:16 PM 
 
The most restrictive states require each retail energy supplier to 
demonstrate that its energy portfolio consists of a certain percentage of 
renewable energy that is either generated by the supplier itself (as in a 
vertical utility) or procured by the supplier from in-state renewable 
generators.  By limiting a supplier’s compliance options, the state ensures 
that the renewable power used to satisfy the RPS is generally generated 
in-state.  Arizona,28 Hawaii,29 and Iowa,30 each follow this option. 
A few other states employ a similar scheme to ensure that the 
renewable power used to satisfy the state’s RPS is generated locally.   
For example, although Texas allows a supplier to use out-of-state RECs 
for compliance, the state requires that the energy output of the facility be 
metered within Texas.31  Nevada has a similar requirement.32  Other 
states provide incentives for suppliers to satisfy their RPS obligation 
with renewable power generated in-state.  The most direct form of incentive 
is an in-state REC multiplier whereby a REC created through renewable 
power generated in-state is worth a greater amount toward the supplier’s 
RPS obligation than a REC created by renewable power generated out-
of-state.  For example, Colorado has such a provision.  The state counts 
each kilowatt-hour (“kWh”) of renewable energy generated in Colorado 
as 1.25 kilowatt-hours of energy for purposes of satisfying the state’s 
RPS requirement.33 
Many states use REC multipliers to encourage the development of 
particular types of renewable energy—an approach that often favors 
 28. In Arizona, utilities may obtain bundled RECs to satisfy the state RPS requirement.  
See Arizona: Incentives/Policies for Renewable Energy, supra note 21.  
 29. Hawaii Renewable Portfolio Standard Summary, UNION OF CONCERNED 
SCIENTISTS 3 (April 2008), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_ 
energy/hawaii.pdf.  
 30. “Iowa requires its two investor-owned utilities . . . to own or to contract for a 
combined total of 105 megawatts (MW) of renewable generating capacity.”  Iowa: 
Incentives/Policies for Renewables & Efficiency, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR 
RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_ 
Code=IA01R&RE=1&EE=1 (last updated June 29, 2011). 
 31. Texas regulations provide that, to be eligible for credits, the output of the renewable 
energy facility “must be readily capable of being physically metered and verified in 
Texas by the program administrator.”  The regulations further provide:  “Energy from a 
renewable facility that is delivered into a transmission system where it is commingled 
with electricity from non-renewable resources before being metered cannot be verified as 
delivered to Texas customers.”  TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 26.173(c)(11), (e)(4) (2010). 
 32. Nevada Renewable Portfolio Standard Summary, UNION OF CONCERNED 
SCIENTISTS 5 (Jan. 2007), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_ 
energy/nevada.pdf. 
 33. 4 COLO. CODE REGS. 723-3 § 3654(e) (2007).  For example, Colorado grants 
1.25 RECs for renewable energy generated in-state and 1.0 REC for renewable energy 
generated out-of-state.  Colorado: Incentives/Policies for Renewable Energy, DATABASE 
OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/ 
incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=CO24R&re=1&ee=1 (last updated Sept. 27, 2010). 
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local generation of renewable power.  In Texas, for instance, a given 
amount of non-wind renewable power creates twice the amount of RECs 
as wind power.34  In Delaware, photovoltaic (“PV”) solar power installed 
prior to 2015 will yield three times the amount of RECs as non-
photovoltaic solar power.35  Some states apply a REC credit multiplier to 
distributed generation—which is renewable power generated on-site or 
on a small scale.36  This also has the effect of favoring in-state renewable 
energy generators. 
Other states include a solar power or a distributed generation “set-aside” 
in their RPS to favor in-state generation of renewable power.  Under a 
set-aside, some fraction of the RPS must be met through the generation 
of a particular renewable technology.  Sixteen states and the District of 
Columbia have adopted solar or broader distributed generation set-asides 
or credit multipliers as part of their RPS policies.37  In encouraging the 
generation of solar power, without reducing the total amount of renewable 
energy generated through a RPS, solar carve-outs are proving more 
effective than credit multipliers.38 
A majority of states allow the suppliers of electricity subject to the 
state’s RPS to comply through the use of “unbundled RECs” or tradable 
RECs (“TRECs”)—RECs that are not accompanied by a purchase of the 
renewable electricity represented by the REC.39  Nevertheless, most of 
these states limit the TRECs that satisfy the state RPS to RECs representing 
power generated within the state or fed into the power pool serving the 
state.  States requiring the power be delivered into the state include 
California,40 Illinois,41 Montana,42 New Mexico,43 New York,44 Ohio,45 
 34. Wiser & Barbose, supra note 8, at 16 fig.8. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id.  For instance, Washington provides a 2x credit multiplier for distributed 
generation. 
 37. See Solar Set-Asides in Renewables Portfolio Standards, DATABASE FOR STATE 
INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/solar/solarpolicy 
guide/?id=21 (last visited July 14, 2011). 
 38. Ryan Wiser, Galen Barbose & Ed Holt, Supporting Solar Power in Renewables 
Portfolio Standards: Experience from the United States, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L 
LAB. 34 (Oct. 2010), available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/lbnl-3984e.pdf. 
 39. See Elder, supra note 9, at 7. 
 40. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25741(a)–(b) (2010); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE    
§§ 399.12(a)–(c), (e), 399.15 (2011); see also CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.13(c)–(d) 
(2011). 
 41. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 3855/1-75(c)(3) (2011). 
 42. MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-3-2003(7) (2011). 
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and Wisconsin.46  An in-state delivery requirement ensures that the 
renewable electricity is generated either in state or in close proximity to 
the state so that it can be transmitted to in-state customers. 
A sizable number of states, mostly in the northeastern United States, 
have adopted a regional delivery requirement.  These states require only 
that the renewable power be generated within or delivered into the regional 
electricity distribution system serving the state.  States with a regional 
delivery requirement include: Connecticut,47 Maine,48 Maryland,49 
Massachusetts,50 New Hampshire,51 New Jersey,52 Pennsylvania,53 and 
Rhode Island.54  Only two states—Colorado55 and Missouri56—are 
reported to go further than the regional approach and permit the use of 
renewable power generated from any location.57 
One state, California, recently adopted a hybrid approach to RPS 
compliance using a combination of bundled and unbundled RECs.  In 
the context of increasing the state’s RPS mandate to 33 percent, the state 
will, for the first time, allow suppliers to comply with the state RPS 
using TRECs.58  For suppliers, the introduction of TRECs will ease the 
burden of complying with the state’s more stringent RPS.  For out-of-
state renewable generators, California just opened up a new market to 
 43. New Mexico Renewable Portfolio Standard Summary, UNION OF CONCERNED 
SCIENTISTS 3 (Feb. 2008), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_ 
energy/new-mexico.pdf. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-245(a)–(b) (West 2011). 
 48. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 3210(2)(B)(1) (2011). 
 49. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. §§ 7-701(i), 7-704(a)(2) (West 2011). 
 50. 225 MASS. CODE REGS. 14.05(1)(a)(9)(d)(1)–(2), (5)(a)–(c) (2011).  To 
generate energy eligible for use to comply with Massachusetts’s RPS, off-grid renewable 
power generation must be located in Massachusetts and behind-the-meter generation 
must be located within the ISO-NE Control Area. 
 51. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362-F:6(IV) (2011). 
 52. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 14:8-2.7(b)–(c) (2011). 
 53. See Pennsylvania's “Alternative” Energy Law, ACTIONPA, http://www.actionpa. 
org/cleanenergy/#geography (last visited Nov. 12, 2011). 
 54. Rhode Island Renewable Energy Standard Summary, UNION OF CONCERNED 
SCIENTISTS 4, available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_energy/rhode-
island.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2012). 
 55. Colorado Renewable Energy Standard Summary, UNION OF CONCERNED 
SCIENTISTS 4, available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_energy/ colorado. 
pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2012). 
 56. Missouri Renewable Energy Standard Summary, UNION OF CONCERNED 
SCIENTISTS 3 (NOV. 2008), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_ 
energy/Missouri.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2012). 
 57. But recall that Colorado includes a REC multiplier for renewable energy generated 
within the state.  
 58. S.B. 2, 2011 Cal. Legis. Serv., 1st Ex. Sess. 2, 23 (West). 
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compete for contracts to export power.  To the dismay of many in the 
California electricity industry, however, the state is limiting the 
percentage of the obligation that can be satisfied with TRECs to just 10 
percent of a utility’s obligation.59 
C.  The Motivation Behind the State-Centered Approach 
Most states that employ the state-centered approach appear to be 
motivated by the desire to reap in-state economic benefits from their 
ratepayer-subsidized RPS.  Such economic benefits include cleaner air 
(through the displacement of air pollutants from fossil fuel-fired 
electricity), jobs, taxes and the creation of a “green” image that may 
attract related green-technology industries and new residents.60 
Nevertheless, although valid as a rough approximation, the benefits of 
a state’s RPS do not perfectly match the political boundaries of that state.  
With respect to reductions in air pollution, a state’s RPS may result in 
improving the air quality of another state, not its own, because the 
physical laws of electricity and the nature of interconnected transmission 
grids limit the ability of a state to control where in-state generated 
renewable power can be directed and utilized.  According to one RPS 
law expert, “[a] state’s cost-benefit analysis therefore must determine 
what resources will be displaced by in-state and out-of-state renewables 
(in either case, the displaced resources could well be located outside the 
state), and whether that displacement will cause net improvements in the 
state’s air sheds, land, and waterways.”61  Nor are a state’s political 
boundaries a good proxy for climate mitigation.  Reductions in carbon 
emissions anywhere in the world will have an equivalent impact in 
mitigating climate change impacts within a state and not simply reductions 
taken by the state. 
 59. Steven F. Greenwald & Jeffrey P. Gray, California’s New RPS: Opportunity 
Squandered, POWER (July 1, 2011), http://www.powermag.com/issues/departments/legal 
_and_regulatory/Californias-New-RPS-Opportunity-Squandered_3790_p2.html. 
 60. Barry Rabe, Race to the Top:  The Expanding Role of U.S. State Renewable 
Portfolio Standards, 7 SUSTAIN. DEVEL. L. & POL’Y 10, 10 (2007).  See also Kirsten H. 
Engel & Barak Y. Orbach, Micro-Motives and State and Local Climate Change Initiatives, 2 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 119 (2008). 
 61. Nancy Rader & Scott Hempling, The Renewable Portfolio Standard: A Practical 
Guide, NAT’L ASS’N OF REGULATORY UTIL. COMM’RS 34 (Feb. 2001), available at 
http://www.naruc.org/Grants/Documents/rps.pdf. 
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III.  LEGAL RISKS 
The state-centered approach also carries legal risks.  The greatest of 
these risks is that state RPS laws favoring in-state generation of 
renewable power might be successfully challenged on constitutional 
grounds as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.  Granted, to 
date, there has been no court ruling invalidating a state RPS law or 
regulation on this basis.  Nevertheless, this may be attributed to a dearth 
of motivated plaintiffs as opposed to a lack of a meritorious legal basis 
for such a challenge.  There are many reasons a provider of renewable 
power might not challenge a state’s preference for renewable power 
generated in-state.  Those renewable power providers located within the 
state serve to benefit from the restriction and hence may have little 
motivation to challenge it.  Renewable power companies located outside 
of the subject state may not be in a position to compete for power sales 
within the state at issue and hence may have difficulty demonstrating  
harm attributable to the in-state restriction.  Furthermore, even if outside 
providers could make such a demonstration, constitutional litigation 
is expensive and even a successful result does not guarantee any 
benefit.  While they may succeed in invalidating an in-state geographic 
preference, this does not guarantee that they will receive a contract for 
the provision of power as opposed to another renewable power provider.  
Hence, filing a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to state RPS 
geographic restrictions carries high risks and minimal benefits for a 
renewable energy generator.62 
Nevertheless, in just the past two years, three challenges to state RPS 
geographic preferences have been filed.  This may signal the rising costs 
of these preference provisions to participants in the renewable energy 
market.  This section will discuss the status of these legal challenges in 
an attempt to assess the significance of the legal risk posed by state RPS 
geographic restrictions. 
A.  Escalating Legal Risk? 
Within the past two years, three legal challenges have been filed 
against state geographic location restrictions in state RPS laws. 
In 2010, TransCanada, a power marketer that purchases wholesale 
renewable energy and sells it to distribution companies and retail 
customers in the northeastern United States, challenged geographic 
 62. I owe Jerry Elmer from the Conservation Law Foundation for the benefit of 
these insights.  E-mail from Jerry Elmer, Staff Att’y, Conservation Law Found., to Kirsten H. 
Engel, Professor of Law, Univ. of Arizona James E. Rogers Coll. of Law (Sept. 3, 2010) 
(on file with author). 
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restrictions applicable to Massachusetts’s statutes and regulations 
encouraging the generation of renewable power as a violation of the 
dormant Commerce Clause.  Under one provision, the Massachusetts 
Department of Energy Resources implemented a statutory requirement 
that utilities purchase a portion of the RECs needed to comply with the 
state’s RPS from solar generation located within the state.63  Under the 
second provision challenged by TransCanada, Massachusetts required 
retail electricity providers to solicit bids for long-term electricity 
supply contracts from renewable generators located within Massachusetts.64  
Renewable energy advocates consider long-term contracts to be of 
critical importance to developers of new renewable energy projects 
because they assist developers in obtaining bank financing for their 
projects.  Ultimately, the case was settled after Massachusetts repealed 
in-state restrictions upon its solar set-aside provision.65 
Also in 2010, TransCanada challenged the in-state renewables purchase 
requirement accompanying the long-term contracting requirement 
enacted by Rhode Island in 2009.66  Similar to the statute in Massachusetts, 
the Rhode Island statute requires electric distribution companies to enter 
into long-term contracts with renewable energy generators.  However, 
the statute articulated an explicit preference for renewable energy 
generated “within the jurisdictional boundaries of the state.”67  
 63. 225 MASS. CODE REGS. 14.05(1)(a)(1) (proposed Oct. 1, 2010).  This regulation 
implemented a Massachusetts statute mandating that each utility meet a portion of its 
RPS requirement through “new on-site renewable energy generating sources located in 
the [C]ommonwealth,” and providing the Department of Energy Resources with the 
authority to “specify that a certain percentage of these requirements shall be met through 
energy generated from a specific technology or fuel type.”  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 25A,  
§ 11F(e), (g) (2011). 
 64. Green Communities Act, S. 169, § 83 (2008).  This provision required that, 
beginning July 1, 2009, distribution companies must, within 5 years, solicit proposals for 
long-term contracts from in-state renewable energy generators at least twice.  If the 
distribution companies receive “reasonable proposals,” they must “enter into cost-effective 
long-term contracts to facilitate the financing of renewable energy generation within the 
jurisdictional boundaries of the Commonwealth.” 
 65. Stephen Lacey, Is Requiring In-State Generation Unconstitutional?, 
RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (June 21, 2010), http://www.renewableenergyworld. 
com/rea/blog/post/2010/06/is-in-state-generation-unconstitutional. 
 66. TransCanada Power Marketing LTD’s Motion to Dismiss for Violation of 
Commerce Clause, In Re: Review of Amended Power Purchase Agreement Between 
Narragansett Electric Company D/B/A National Grid and Deepwater Wind Block Island, 
LLC Pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-36.1.7, Docket No. 4185 (filed July 13, 2010). 
 67. R. I. Gen. Laws § 39-26.1 (“The purpose of this chapter is to encourage and 
facilitate the creation of commercially reasonable long-term contracts between electric 
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Finally, the most recent, and also the most worrisome from the 
perspective of state RPS advocates, is an across-the-board challenge to 
Colorado’s RPS filed in 2011 by the American Tradition Institute, a 
politically-conservative advocacy group.68  Although the complaint targets 
the RPS in general as a violation of the Commerce Clause, several of its 
more targeted allegations are noteworthy.  Specifically, the complaint 
challenges an aspect of Colorado’s RPS solar power set-aside that 
requires half of the set-aside to originate from solar power installations 
located on-site at the customer’s facilities.69  The complaint also challenges 
various compliance-credit multipliers included in the law that favor in-
state generation of renewable power.  In particular, a kilowatt-hour 
obtained from renewable resources located within Colorado has a greater 
compliance value than a kilowatt-hour of renewable power generated 
out-of-state.70  The complaint also alleges that the Colorado RPS extends 
the same preferential accounting method to renewable power generated 
through community-based projects located in Colorado and to Colorado-
based renewable power projects that interconnect to electric transmission 
or distribution facilities owned by a cooperative electric association or a 
municipally-owned utility.71 
Interestingly, the American Tradition Institute lawsuit is the only legal 
action to date that challenges the legality of a distributed generation set-
aside and an in-state credit multiplier.  While the latter is fairly rare 
within state RPS laws, the former is common.  Hence, the lawsuit could 
have broad implications for distributed generation set-aside provisions 
beyond Colorado. 
B.  Recent Developments in the Court’s Dormant  
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence 
The basic framework of the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence has remained relatively unchanged in the past thirty years.  
A state law that discriminates on its face against interstate commerce is 
distribution companies and developers or sponsors of newly developed renewable energy 
resources with the goals of stabilizing long-term energy prices, enhancing environmental 
quality, creating jobs in Rhode Island in the renewable energy sector, and facilitating the 
financing of renewable energy generation within the jurisdictional boundaries of the state 
or adjacent state or federal waters or providing direct economic benefit to the state.”).   
 68. Complaint, American Tradition Institute v. Colorado, Civ. Action No. 1:11-
CV-00859 (D. Colo) (filed Apr. 4, 2011) [hereinafter “Complaint”]. 
 69. Id. para. 68–74. 
 70. For instance, the Colorado RPS provides that “[e]ach kilowatt-hour of electricity 
generated from eligible energy resources in Colorado . . . shall be counted as one and 
one-quarter kilowatt-hours for the purposes of compliance with this standard.”  COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 40-2-124(1)(c)(III) (2011). 
 71. Complaint, supra note 68, para. 74. 
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considered per se invalid.72  On the other hand, a state law that regulates 
even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate state interest with only 
“incidental” impacts upon interstate commerce is subject to a balancing 
test.  Under this test, the state law will be upheld unless the burden on 
interstate commerce is “clearly excessive” in relation to local benefits.73 
At the same time, the Court’s recent decisions indicate that the justices 
are losing interest in a vigorous approach to the enforcement of the 
dormant Commerce Clause.  Indeed, Justices Scalia and Thomas have 
proclaimed that they think the whole doctrine should be scrapped due to 
the absence of a textual basis for the doctrine.  Justice Scalia has stated 
that he is willing to apply the dormant Commerce Clause only where 
stare decisis compels him.74  It is not clear that Justice Thomas would 
even go so far as to apply the doctrine where warranted by precedent.75  
In any case, the reluctance of Justices Scalia and Thomas means two of 
the nine justices are unlikely to strike down a state law on dormant 
Commerce Clause grounds, at least if they can distinguish the case from 
prior precedent.  Although the other justices have not manifested this same 
willingness to scrap the dormant Commerce Clause, they do seem to 
have softened on the applicability of the doctrine where state or local 
government has actively intervened in the private market associated with 
a traditional local or state government function. 
Within this context, two developments are noteworthy.  First, the 
Court has rejuvenated the traditional governmental functions test as an 
exemption to the Clause.  Second, the Court has broadened the exception 
for discriminatory actions by states in their capacity as market actors. 
1.  Rejuvenation of the Traditional Governmental                                     
Function Test 
In two recent cases, the Supreme Court has unearthed the traditional 
public function test under which the Court had previously upheld local 
regulations that discriminate in favor of the local government itself.  In 
an opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, in United Haulers v. 
 72. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624. 
 73. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 74. Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 359 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“I will apply our negative Commerce Clause doctrine only when stare decisis compels 
me to do so.”). 
 75. Id. at 361 (“I would entirely ‘discard the Court’s negative Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence.’”) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 95 
 
ENGEL FINAL AUTHOR EDITS ACCEPTED WITH UPDATE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/2016  2:16 PM 
 
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, the Court upheld 
flow control ordinances enacted by New York county governments that 
ensured that the trash generated in the counties was delivered by private 
waste haulers to solid waste processing facilities owned and run by a 
government authority created by the State of New York.76  The Court 
held that the ordinances were not facially discriminatory and hence were 
properly analyzed under the Pike undue burden test.77 
Applying the Pike test, the Court upheld the county flow control 
ordinance.  The decision rested on two factors.  First, the Court could not 
find any tangible harm to out-of-state interests resulting from the law.  
Instead, the Court found that the “most palpable harm” fell upon the 
very persons that voted for it in the first place—the residents of the 
counties that enacted the flow control ordinances and who would thus 
pay the higher fees for solid waste disposal charged by the state processing 
facilities (as opposed to competitor facilities).78 
Second, the Court supported its Pike analysis by rejuvenating an older 
distinction since abandoned by the Court—that the ordinance was 
enacted in order to benefit the localities in carrying out a “typical and 
traditional concern of local government.”79  At another point in the 
opinion, the Court quoted a Second Circuit decision that labels garbage 
collection and disposal a “core function of local government in the 
United States.”80 
While the unearthing of the traditional function distinction has caught 
the attention of commentators, it is not clear that its use in United 
Haulers (as opposed to Dep’t of Revenue) is all that significant.  The 
Court clearly held that the ordinance was valid under the Pike test, based 
upon the lack of a clear interstate burden, and the existence of local 
benefits in the form of revenue generation and enhanced incentives for 
recycling and enforcement of recycling laws.  If anything, the Court’s 
resort to the traditional government function rationale merely boosts the 
Court’s conclusions under the Pike test. 
Thus, potentially more important is the use of the traditional 
government function rationale in a later case, Department of Revenue of 
Kentucky v. Davis, to exempt from Commerce Clause scrutiny a state 
law exempting interest from bonds issued by the state (but not from 
 76. See, e.g., Davis, 553 U.S. 328; United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer 
Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007). 
 77. United Haulers Ass’n, 550 U.S. at 330. 
 78. Id. at 345. 
 79. Id. at 346–47. 
 80. Id. at 344 (quoting USA Recycling, Inc. v. Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1275 
(C.A.2 1995)). 
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bonds issued by other states) from state taxes.81  In an opinion written by 
the now-retired Justice Souter, the Court held that the issuance of debt 
securities to pay for public projects is quintessentially a public function 
and hence the tax preference was justified under United Haulers.82  The 
Court was careful to point out that the tax preference benefited only a 
public entity—the State—and not private participants in the market for 
bonds and securities.83 
2.  Expansion of the Market Participant                                        
Doctrine Exemption 
The Dep’t of Revenue case is significant in another respect: by 
upholding the Kentucky tax preference, the Court broadened the market 
participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause. 
The Kentucky appeals court had rejected the market participant exception 
as inapplicable to the law at issue because the state’s tax preference was 
a separate regulation that, on its face, was unconnected with any 
participation by the state itself in the bond market.  However, the 
Supreme Court rejected this as a basis for not applying the exception, 
holding that it was not possible to disentangle the state’s action as a 
regulator (enacting the tax preference) from its capacity as a market 
participant (issuing bonds) because “imposing the differential tax scheme 
makes sense only because Kentucky is also a bond issuer.”84  Hence, to 
the Court, the state’s regulatory preference was part and parcel of its 
market participation: “when Kentucky exempts its bond interest, it is 
competing in the market for limited investment dollars, alongside private 
bond issuers and its sister States, and its tax structure is one of the tools 
of competition.”85 
Thus, in Dep’t of Revenue, the Court expanded the market participant 
exception to encompass overtly discriminatory regulatory actions that a 
state or local government may undertake to assist the government entity 
in its activities within the market.  The fact that the Court reinterpreted 
the United Haulers case as being justified by the market participant 
exemption underscores this expansion.  The United Haulers Court did not 
 81. Davis, 553 U.S. at 341–42. 
 82. Id. at 342–43. 
 83.  Id. at 343. 
 84. Id. at 344. 
 85. Id. 
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rely upon this exception, presumably because the issue in the case was 
the impact of government regulations—the county flow ordinances—as 
opposed to the impact of actions by the state authority-run solid waste 
processing facilities.  However, in Dep’t of Revenue, the Court stated that 
United Haulers “may also be seen under the broader rubric of the market 
participation doctrine.”86  According to the Dep’t of Revenue Court, the 
dispositive fact in United Haulers was the government’s own activity in 
processing trash.  Indeed, it was the fact of the state’s involvement in 
the trash processing business that, the Court stated, distinguished the 
case from the C & A Carbone case in which the Court invalidated the 
challenged flow control ordinance enacted in favor of a solid waste 
processing facility operated by a private company.87 
C.  Validity of In-state Location Preferences in                                            
State RPS Law 
Under the traditional dormant Commerce Clause analysis set forth 
under Philadelphia v. New Jersey and its progeny, state RPS provisions 
that explicitly mandate the purchase of renewable power generated in-
state, or that even preference renewable power generated in-state, would 
appear to be unconstitutional.  For example, the Massachusetts statutory 
provisions at issue in the TransCanada complaint would appear to have 
violated the dormant Commerce Clause.  The plain language of the 
statute differentiated between in-state and out-of-state renewable energy 
generators, specifying that only the in-state generation of solar power 
could satisfy the law’s solar power set-aside, and that only contracts for 
renewable energy resources generated in-state would satisfy the 
Commonwealth’s long-term supply contract requirement.  Thus, these 
provisions plainly facially discriminated against interstate commerce in 
favor of in-state firms and hence would likely have been struck down by 
a court had the case not settled.  The same is true with respect to the 
facially-discriminatory long-term contracting provision in Rhode 
Island’s RPS law.88 
There is little reason to believe that traditional dormant Commerce 
Clause analysis would produce a different result with respect to a law 
that, like the Colorado RPS provision challenged in the 2011 lawsuit by 
the American Tradition Institute, bestows a greater value upon in-state 
renewable generation by applying a multiplier to only renewable energy 
 86. Id. at 343. 
 87. Id. at 346–47. 
 88. See also Nathan E. Endrud, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Their Continued 
Validity and Relevance in Light of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause, 
and Possible Federal Legislation, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 259, 270 (2008). 
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generated in-state.  Multipliers facially discriminate against interstate 
commerce in favor of intrastate commerce.  It matters not that the 
provision at issue is in the nature of an incentive as opposed to a 
regulatory mandate.89 
It is possible—though unlikely—that the RPS statutory provisions at 
issue in the recent litigation could be upheld based upon one of the 
exceptions to the dormant Commerce Clause reaffirmed in the Court’s 
recent cases, i.e., discriminatory regulation that assists a state or local 
government in carrying out a traditional governmental function or 
participating in a market.90 
To qualify for the first exception, electricity generation must be 
considered a traditional government function.  The Supreme Court has 
never ruled on whether this is the case.  Electricity generation has long 
been the subject of government regulation and also government provision.  
In the late 1800s, municipally-owned utilities provided street lighting 
and trolley services.  However, the share of electricity provided by 
municipally-owned utilities never exceeded the high of 8 percent reached at 
the turn of the century.91  Starting in the 1930s, the federal government 
began an era of providing electric power, beginning with large reclamation 
projects in the American West.92  With the addition of the Tennessee 
Valley Authority, the provision of federal power reached its peak of 17 
percent of total electricity generation in 1957.93  Non-federal public 
power projects, consisting of cooperatives, power districts and state 
projects, also grew rapidly in this time period, reaching a peak of 8.5 
percent in 1960.94  Subsequent to this time period of heavy involvement by 
primarily the federal government in electricity generation, the role of the 
government in the provision of electricity has primarily been that of a 
regulator.  Whether, as a result, electricity generation qualifies as a 
“traditional government function” is unclear.  Certainly it has been an 
important historical function of government.  Nevertheless, the dominant 
role of commercial entities in providing electricity indicates that the 
 89. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 271 (1988). 
 90. Davis, 553 U.S. at 342–43. 
 91. EDISON ELEC. INST., HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY 
THROUGH 1970 24 (2d ed. 1973). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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economics of the industry are not characterized by market failures that 
would necessitate the provision of electricity by government. 
To qualify for the second exception, the state discriminating in favor 
of in-state renewable power would have to be a provider of renewable 
electricity.  In such a case, the state might argue that its regulatory 
preference for renewable energy generated in-state was merely to assist 
the state’s participation in the electricity market.  However, in the states 
favoring in-state generation of renewable power, the state government 
itself is not providing the electricity.  Even if it was, its regulatory 
preferences for in-state renewable power generation are broader than the 
simple benefit of state-run entities.  In contrast, the Court made clear in 
United Haulers and in Dep’t. of Revenue that the laws at issue solely 
benefited the government entity participating in the market. 
Hence, it is difficult to make the case that the Court’s recent dormant 
Commerce Clause cases would authorize the preferences for in-state 
generation of renewable power present in the RPS statutes and regulations 
enacted or promulgated by Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Colorado. 
With respect to the requirements in other RPS laws that the renewable 
energy be delivered into the state or to state consumers, the case for 
validity under the dormant Commerce Clause is stronger.  Such a 
requirement does not facially discriminate against interstate commerce 
and hence such provisions would be analyzed under the Pike balancing 
test as opposed to the per se invalidity test of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.  
In the context of this balancing test, the state could argue that the local 
benefits flowing from such a requirement, especially reduced air pollution, 
justifies whatever burden such a delivery requirement imposes upon 
interstate commerce. 
IV.  THE CASE FOR A REGIONAL APPROACH TO RENEWABLE  
PORTFOLIO STANDARDS 
The state-centered approach to renewable portfolio standards in which 
states impose various requirements or incentives to encourage the in-
state generation of renewable power has several drawbacks.  First, such 
requirements would increase costs for state ratepayers by forcing utilities 
to purchase in-state generated power even in situations where renewable 
power generated out-of-state is cheaper.  Second, to the extent the state’s 
motivation is to benefit the overall welfare of the state by improving air 
quality and encouraging the in-state generation of renewable power with 
its associated promise of jobs, taxes, and spin-off businesses, research 
demonstrates that such benefits are best encouraged on the regional 
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level, as opposed to the state-level.95  Thus, the use of state political 
boundaries as a guide to such incentives is likely to reduce the total 
quantity of such benefits. 
If a state-centered approach is not the most optimal method for 
reaping the benefits of renewable power generation, why have so many 
states adopted the approach as opposed to a larger, more regional approach?  
One explanation is that, acting unilaterally, states lack any incentive to 
adopt a regional approach.  Insofar as a regional approach may, for instance, 
lead to states allowing freely-tradable RECs to satisfy their state RPSs 
(as opposed to RECs created through the generation of in-state renewable 
power), why should a state unilaterally allow such RECs to satisfy its 
RPS when this means utilities might satisfy the state RPS entirely through 
renewable power generated out of state?  States are unlikely to do so in 
the absence of an assurance from other states that they are similarly 
allowing for compliance with their RPS with out-of-state generated 
power, thereby increasingly the likelihood that the state will benefit from 
a relaxation of the state-centered approach. 
The pattern of the payoffs facing states as to whether they should 
allow compliance with their RPS with out-of-state generated renewable 
power or only in-state generated renewable power thus resembles the 
payoff structure found in the classic prisoner’s dilemma.  Under this 
structure, it is rational that players pursue their own interest and not 
cooperate with the other players, even if each player would benefit the 
greatest if she cooperated with the other players.  The payoffs to individual 
states interested in supporting renewable power through an RPS law 
might be assigned hypothetical values and resemble those in Figure 1 on 
the next page. 
  
 95. See Mark Muro & Kenan Fikri, Job Creation on a Budget: How Regional Industry 
Clusters Can Add Jobs, Bolster Entrepreneurship, and Spark Innovation, in PROJECT ON 
STATE AND METROPOLITAN INNOVATION (Brookings-Rockefeller ed., 2011); Mark Muro 
& Bruce Katz, The New “Cluster Moment”: How Regional Innovation Clusters Can 
Foster the Next Economy, in METROPOLITAN POLICY PROGRAM (Brookings ed., 2010). 
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FIGURE 1: HYPOTHETICAL PAYOFFS FACING STATES CHOOSING                      
BETWEEN RESTRICTING RECS TO IN-STATE GENERATION ONLY                                      
OR ALLOWING RECS TO REFLECT OUT-OF-STATE GENERATION 
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V.  RECS TO REFLECT OUT-OF-STATE GENERATION 
A cooperative regional approach, similar to the regional greenhouse 
gas emissions trading regimes adopted by states (e.g., RGGI), addresses 
the prisoner’s dilemma inherent in a state’s choice as to whether to allow 
the generation of renewable power out-of-state to satisfy its state RPS.  
Under such an approach, each of the states within a particular region— 
the northeastern, Midwestern or Western states, for instance—would 
agree to adopt laws or regulations that would allow renewable energy 
produced within or delivered into the region to be used by energy suppliers 
within their state to satisfy the state’s RPS.  This would address the 
prisoner’s dilemma issue since every state would know that although it 
would be opening its RPS market to out-of-state (but in-region) renewable 
power, so would every other state within the region.  Provided that the 
renewable energy produced in each state is at least somewhat competitive in 
price with the renewable power generated in the other states within the 
region, this agreement should be sufficient to make each state comfortable 
allowing its suppliers to the use of this out-of-state but in-region renewable 
energy. 
Second, there is some reason to believe that by adopting a regional 
trading market, states could be made better off economically than were 
they to stick to the creation of single state markets.  As mentioned above, a 
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regional market might lead to lower costs for renewable power, leading 
to ratepayer savings.  In addition, however, the regional trading market 
might create a larger market for renewable generators and spin-off industries, 
such as manufacturing and research facilities.  This could create a stronger, 
more vibrant and potentially larger renewables industry on the regional 
scale than might be created on a state-by-state basis.  Supporting this 
hypothesis are studies suggesting that economic development is most 
successful when pursued on a regional, as opposed to a state-by-state, 
basis.96 
Finally, location restrictions designed to foster a regional renewable 
energy market may have a better chance of withstanding Commerce 
Clause scrutiny than similar restrictions designed to enable a state market.  
Granted, the Court has indicated that facial discrimination on the basis of 
regional boundaries is no different than facial discrimination on the basis 
of state boundaries.97  However, by adopting only an in-region delivery 
requirement (allowing renewable energy delivered into the region to 
comply with the state’s RPS) as opposed to an in-region generation 
requirement, the state avoids facial discrimination and the potential that 
its law will be struck down as a “per se” violation of the dormant 
Commerce Clause.  An in-region delivery requirement is not facially 
discriminatory as renewable energy generated out-of-state but delivered 
into the region could be used by energy suppliers to comply with the 
state RPS.  Under the less stringent Pike v. Bruce Church test prohibiting 
undue burdens upon interstate commerce,98 a state enacting an in-region 
delivery requirement will have a much better chance of surviving a 
Commerce Clause challenge.  For one, given the larger regional market 
and hence the greater number of out-of-region locations where out-of-
 96. See Muro & Fikri, supra note 95; Muro & Katz, supra note 95. 
 97. See Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985).  
In this case, two New England states authorized bank holding companies located in other 
New England states to purchase an in-state bank only if the state in which the holding 
company was located afforded reciprocal privileges to the authorizing state’s holding companies.  
The Court stated that discrimination by states against bank holding companies located 
outside a particular region would violate the dormant Commerce Clause in the same manner 
as state discrimination against holding companies merely located out-of-state.  Id.  (“There 
can be little dispute that the dormant Commerce Clause would prohibit a group of States 
from establishing a system of regional banking by excluding bank holding companies 
from outside the region if Congress had remained completely silent on the subject.”).  
This statement is arguably dicta, however, as the Court went on to hold that Congress 
had authorized any discrimination that might be involved.  Id. 
 98. Pike, 397 U.S. at 146. 
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region renewable energy might be imported into the region, there is less 
likelihood that the in-region delivery requirement will impose an “undue 
burden” upon renewable energy generated located out-of-region.  
Furthermore, where such an undue burden might be found, the legitimacy 
of the state’s justification for the burden will be stronger.  This is 
because the state can argue that such an in-region delivery requirement 
increases the likelihood that the renewable energy used to comply with 
the state’s RPS is displacing dirtier fossil fuel power and hence that the 
region will reap the associated environmental benefits of the state RPS.  
Here, it may be important that the state contend that a motivation of its 
RPS law is the reduction in conventional pollutants, such as particulates, 
sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxides generated by fossil-fuel burning sources 
of energy, and not just reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.  Because, 
as global pollutants, greenhouse gas reductions cannot be limited to any 
particular location, much less a region, reliance upon the greenhouse 
gas reduction benefits is a less persuasive justification for an in-region 
delivery requirement.  Reduction of conventional pollutants is a stronger 
justification for a state’s in-region delivery restriction as this benefit can 
be localized to a particular region. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The emergence of multi-state greenhouse gas initiatives highlights the 
benefits of addressing climate change through regional, as opposed to 
state-level, policy approaches.  Specifically, enabling electric utilities to 
comply with state greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets on a regional 
basis, as is done currently under the northeastern states’ Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, reduces the costs of compliance for those 
sources and lowers costs for ratepayers. 
While some states—primarily those in the northeast—similarly allow 
utilities to comply with state renewable energy mandates through the 
purchase of renewable energy generated within the same region, many 
others require that the energy be generated within or be delivered into the 
state.  This state-limited approach to RPS compliance is a manifestation 
of a more general characteristic of the structure of state RPS laws to 
favor in-state investment in renewable energy.  Such a preference is 
completely understandable given that renewable energy is not yet cost 
competitive with fossil fuel-based energy and that the RPS functions as a 
ratepayer subsidy to renewable energy generation.  In-state economic 
development resulting from renewable energy thus functions as an implicit 
“pay back” for this subsidy. 
Nevertheless, the in-state investment preference inherent in the location 
restrictions found in many state RPS laws has several drawbacks.  Not 
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only is the efficiency of the market created through the RPS law limited, 
leading to higher prices for renewable power (and perhaps lower RPS 
targets than might otherwise be supported by voters were prices lower), 
but inclusion of state-level preferences run the risk of invalidation by the 
courts under the dormant Commerce Clause.  While still low, the last 
several years have seen an upswing in the number of challenges to state-
level preference provisions in state RPS laws on dormant Commerce 
Clause grounds. 
 Given the objectives of renewable power advocates in continuing the 
ratepayer-based subsidization of renewable power, which, as discussed, 
is implicitly tied to the ability to channel the resulting investment in a 
manner that generates local economic development benefits, as well as a 
corresponding desire to minimize the risk of a successful Commerce Clause 
challenge, broadening investment preferences so that they operate on the 
regional, as opposed to state-level, scale, may be a solution.  Location 
restrictions designed to foster a regional renewable energy market may 
better survive Commerce Clause scrutiny than similar restrictions 
designed to enhance a state market.  Furthermore, research suggests that 
economic development initiatives are most successful when pursued on 
a regional, as opposed to a state-level, basis.  States should thus be 
encouraged to revise the preferences now included in their RPS laws for 
renewable energy generated within or delivered to the state and rework 
them into preferences for renewable power delivered into the region of 
which they are a part. 
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